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PUBLIC IMPERIALISM AND PRIVATE RESISTANCE:
PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES OF THE

NEW PRIVATE LAW
GARY PELLER"

In hosting this Symposium on "The New Private Law," the Denver University Law Review is to be commended for providing an occasion to reflect
on a clearly recognizable but insufficiently conceptualized development in the
contemporary legal/political arena. If I understand the topic, the New Private
Law is meant to connect various trends in law and social policy as part of a
single phenomenon; examples include school voucher programs, privatization
of prisons, contracting out traditional municipal functions, the movement from
public trial to private mediation and arbitration, curtailment of the state action
doctrine and thus limitations on the application of constitutional norms with
respect to a range of institutions, and the various ways of delegating lawmaking power to formally private groups. The markers of this transformation are
generally: (a) distrust of centralized public administration, (b) commitment to
increased choice for individuals, and (c) new faith in the social responsiveness
of institutional arrangements based on the profit motive.
Several years ago, my colleague William Eskridge and I described a contemporary jurisprudential phenomenon that we dubbed the New Public Law.'
Our basic idea was that a cadre of contemporary mainstream legal scholars
had coalesced around a "centrist" approach to law in response to the polarizing and ideologically charged character of the legal academy in the 1970s and
1980s. Paralleling in many ways the postwar "legal process' '2 response to the
radical possibilities of legal realism, we saw the New Public Law as an
implicit attempt to incorporate the intellectual sophistication and general political direction of the Left's critical scholarship (embodied primarily in the work
of critical legal studies, radical feminist, and critical race intellectual movements), while nevertheless defending a decidedly centrist, de-radicalized normative vision of an apolitical rule of law. We associated the New Public Law
with a pragmatic, republican-oriented, and vaguely reformist attitude toward
legal institutions, within which "public" type values of inclusion, participation,
and cultural respect were taken as emblematic of a "new normativity."3

* Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A., Emory University, 1977; J.D., Harvard University Law School, 1980.
1. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 U. MICH. L. REv. 707 (1991).
2.

See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS

IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994); Gary Peller, "Neutral Principles" in the 1950's, 21 MICH. J.L. REFORM 561 (1988).
3. See Eskridge & Pellet, supra note 1, at 708-09.
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In Eskridge's evaluation, this development was to be applauded as a progressive articulation of the legal discursive tradition rooted in Brown v. Board
of Education' and Warren Court activism more generally. In my evaluation,
New Public Law scholarship-like the legal process school of the
1950s-represented an attempt to domesticate and defang the critical work that
it appropriated, primarily by ignoring the overall point that legal discourse
worked to constitute and legitimate status quo power relations. While Eskridge
celebrated the emergence of a sophisticated view of law as legitimately resolving social conflict in a just way, by paying proper respect to various viewpoints held by the multiple groups making up American society, I saw a bland
form of "post-modem moderation" where the very social conflicts that leftists
had argued mainstream legal discourse suppressed were now to be "processed"
through an inclusive "good-guyism" blind to its own cultural ethnocentrism.
The New Private Law might be taken to be the polar opposite of the New
Public Law-here the emphasis is on "private" values of individual choice and
decentralized decisionmaking where the New Public Law emphasized social
inclusion and public deliberation. But the image of opposition misses more
important similarities in the two tendencies. The New Private Law represents a
slightly conservative correlate to the New Public Law. Both are located near
the center of legal ideology, rather than at the poles (whatever might constitute
the poles these days: perhaps Chicago-style law and economics on the one
hand and post-modem cultural critique on the other). While there is a general
sense that the New Private Law is slightly right of center (the domestication of
law and economics), and New Public Law scholarship appears slightly left of
center (the domestication of critical legal scholarship), the fact of the matter is
that they both have the feel of being, more simply, depoliticized.
This essay reflects upon the transformation implicit in the emergence of
the New Private Law on the contemporary legal scene. My main point is to
note the end of the tradition, dating back at least to the the mid-nineteenth
century, of delineating political ideologies according to the public/private distinction. The association of advocates of the public arena with progressive
social reform and advocates of the private realm with conservative social
ideology is clearly over; the distinction between public and private administrative alternatives has been, for the most part, drained of its ideological significance. Given this development, I conclude that there is, in fact, no reason for
progressives reflexively to oppose many of the various privatization trends that
mark the contemporary policy scene.
In the remainder of this essay, I situate the emergence of the New Private
Law phenomenon in terms of limitations in the ways that progressives have
usually understood the public/private distinction. The highly general framework I sketch is intended to be suggestive and evocative rather than definitive;
I will simplify what are actually much more complex terms of intellectual and
ideological development.

4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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I begin by distinguishing the New Private Law from traditional market
ideology. I next consider how many of the ways that progressives understood
what "public" and "private" politically meant were intellectually and ideologically impoverished. Our association of the public sphere with justice and
equity was blind to the ways that the very conception of a universal, nondiscriminatory equal opportunity could serve to produce colonized institutions
from which virtually everyone is alienated. Conversely, our association of the
movement from public to private with parochialism or oppression ignored the
ways that such social change could signify empowerment and a recovery of
liberatory democratic values. I will use the example of public school reform to
provide a context within which to evaluate these possibilities.
At the outset, it should be emphasized that the New Private Law phenomenon does not represent a resurgent laissez-faire market ideology. While contemporary privatization reforms do often constitute recognizably conservative
or right-wing social interventions, it would mistake the New Private Law simply to associate it with capitalist or libertarian ideology. Instead, the recent
privatization interventions should be seen as more centrist, ideologically diluted institutional developments. Defenders use a discourse that is pragmatic and
situational, not ideal and universal. Champions of the private realm traditionally sought to defend the market as a truly private, unregulated realm of exchange. Their defense was principled: the market represented the realm of
individual free choice and accordingly state intervention threatened not only
economic distortion but a form of tyranny. But the ideology of recent social
reforms such as school voucher programs or contracted prison administration
is not premised on the idea that a truly private realm is being protected from
the coercive power of the State. Rather, privatization is presented as simply
one in an array of possible, and concededly regulative, social interventions,
bearing no a prioriclaim to legitimacy but instead depending on historical and
contextualized justification: the New Private Law might see centralized administration of schools, for example, as having produced dysfunctional and often
corrupt urban institutions, leading to the impetus for alternative institutional
arrangements. From this perspective, then, the New Private Law should be
distinguished from neo-conservative revivals of the theories of private property
and free exchange.5
In addition to the transformed idea of what the private realm represents
for contemporary privatization advocates, the identification of recent reforms
as evidencing a general movement from public and private should not be
exaggerated. Since the realist critique, it has been clear that as an analytic
matter, the categories of "public" and "private" do not signify something outside of legal and political discourse itself. The so-called free market, the paradigm of the private realm, is, properly understood, inseparable from the social
power implicit in the so-called framework rules defining the boundaries of

5. The most notable champion of the principled justifications for such a regime in legal
academe is Richard Epstein. See RICHARD EPSTiEN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). For an extended analysis of the distinction between what is characterized here as the New Private Law and traditional market ideology, see Paul Starr, The Meaning of Privatization,6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 6 (1988).
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"private property" and the permissible pressure that could be brought to bear
in "free exchange." Since terms like "consent," "private property," and "coercion" are not self-defining, any particular choice of their boundaries manifests
a political decision and State "intervention"-with distributive consequences
for the "market" that is supposed to stand outside governmental power. Thus,
for example, the refusal to recognize sexual harassment as a tort does not
leave such behavior to an unregulated "private" realm, but instead bears the
mark of State intervention in the form of a privilege granted to men. Were
women to use "natural" responses of physical force to defend themselves
against the injury that sexual harassment causes, the harassers could call on
the State to defend them. That is, harassed women are not entitled to self-help
in the form of a privilege to engage in self-defense because they are not protecting an interest that is officially recognized by the State, and thus they may
not use force to prevent its invasion. The resulting form of regulation is a
privilege on the part of men to harass and legal exposure on the part of their
victims. And there are distributive consequences from these inevitable "framework" decisions: were such harassment to be officially recognized, harassers
would be worse off and their victims better off-there is simply no way for
the State to stay out of a "private" market because either way it is affecting
the distribution of market wealth and power.
Since the terms of the "private" realm are socially created by the very
legal and political judgments that are supposed to follow from the "private" or
"public" nature of a social encounter, they are, as the realists taught, simply
conclusions attached to judgments reached on other bases. Proponents of the
New Public Law as well as the New Private Law understand this at some
level, and accordingly both approach the market, as did the legal process
school, as simply one administrative alternative to centralized public regulation
rather than as principled and normatively dictated. But taking seriously the
realist critique suggests that it may be ultimately impossible to delineate
administrative options by these labels at all-they are not only relative to a
particular baseline, but also arguably analytically incoherent once they have
lost their grounding as part of an ideology through which power was translated
as choice.
Furthermore, not only is the purportedly private realm arguably public, but
the converse may be true as well. The so-called public realm arguably represents simply another form of private power. Think, for example, of the
workers' compensation system-perhaps the very paradigm of "publicization"
as disputes over workplace injuries were transposed from the former "private"
law of torts to a publicly administered, regulated, and rationalized system. The
lynchpin of a worker's right to recover under most workers' compensation
systems is a disability--ordinarily one that must be identified and documented
as such by a medical doctor. Doctors are, in the conventional typography,
private actors. The "public" character of workers' compensation schemes
depends on taking medical judgment as an objective fact rather than the product of a complex of private power exercised by the medical profession.
Given that the terms "public" and "private" may have no meaning except
relative to a pre-conceived baseline, it is nevertheless true that we do
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recognize the New Private Law as a phenomenon-and also recognize its
slightly more liberal correlate in the New Public Law. I now change focus to
consider how the traditional associations that progressives have made-public
as liberal and private as conservative-may have suppressed from view the
manner in which the public sphere was repressive and alienating, and the
move to the relatively private realm arguably a move to a relatively more
liberatory form of social relations.
My sense of the contemporary environment is that there is no reason to
assume that privatization reforms will necessarily represent conservative rather
than progressive social change. The valance provided by the grand debate
between capitalism as the ideology of the private sphere and socialism as the
ideology of the public sphere now provides only a faint echo in the background of policy debate. Whether a particular form of privatization will be
liberatory or repressive depends on the context and the circumstances; it can
only be evaluated institution by institution and reform by reform. Consider, for
example, the context of public school reform.
Public schools represent a paradigm of publicly administered institutions.
Having their genesis in noble aims of egalitarianism, one might expect that
they would exist as model institutions of democratic and social progressivism.
Moreover, they are administered for the most part by the most local, close-tothe-people of democratic institutions, school boards. And public education is
arguably the institutional context in which the republican values of inclusion
and social tolerance have had their greatest vitality-the Warren Court activism that New Public Law adherents champion was most visibly directed at
reforming public education by ending racial segregation and school prayer.
To my mind, the public education context reveals the deep problems in
the traditional liberal ideology regarding the public and the private and associating universalism and objectivity with equity and equal opportunity. Arguments against various privatization reforms of school management and attendance decisions typically center on the risks that private choice will reproduce
social stratification. But the "public" character of schools that is defended
against the evils of privatization is more or less a total fantasy. Despite the
formally decentralized and localized structure of administration by county or
municipal governmental units-and thus the expectation of popular sovereignty
at its height-American public schools by and large represent the paradigm of
alienating, unresponsive, often corrupt, inefficient, and culturally repressive
social institutions. Despite their public and democratic character, my guess is
that most people who have had occasion to encounter schools boards share my
experience of them as arrogant, unresponsive, technocratic entities presenting
themselves as educational "experts" concerned with professionalism and disdaining parents and students as constituting the threat of "political pressure"
which might interfere with the "educational mission." To the extent that there
are exceptions to this image, they are more often than not occasions when
cultural right-wingers or religious fundamentalists have managed to take over
and inscribe their own value system on their children's education. But progressives have found themselves pitted against such groups, trying to defend public schools against such "parochialism" and "narrowmindedness." What has

1006

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:4

been defended is a professional culture that rather blatantly attempts to manage the community they are supposed to serve by channeling community concerns into technocratically understood "inputs"; thus the need for "parental
input" is understood as a component of appropriate process and management,
but that's it. The ruling ideology is that community intervention represents the
threat of local parochialism invading the province of impersonal professionalism.
The elitism of the school board is part and parcel of a wider progressive
ideology about public education that, ironically, connects this form of elitism
with egalitarianism. The culture of public education today actually represents
the victory of progressive forces against repressive ones-the direction of
reform over the last three or four decades has been away from the private and
local and toward the public and universal, understood to be part of instituting
public values of inclusion, equal opportunity and respect, and deliberative
procedure. From this perspective, it is no simple litigation accident that school
prayer was banned at roughly the same time as racial segregation. Both were
understood as part of a single project to transform public schools into truly
democratic institutions open to all and free of local parochialism and prejudice. Hence the links between ideas of universalism, centralism, and the public
realm in contemporary liberal ideology. As schools come to be managed centrally, in the sense that they institute national standards for curriculum and
teacher training and methodology, the reigning ideology sees each child being
given an equal opportunity to compete in American life and to develop themselves as individuals. The more aloof from local prejudice and influence, the
more "federal" and "public" the day-to-day administration of the schools, the
more egalitarian they are supposed to be. The overarching symbol of these
links between universalism, centralism, and egalitarianism is the number two
pencil marking totally impersonal, anonymous, standardized test answers.
The actual governing structure of public schools is, in terms of the day-today life of teachers and students, a mockery of democratic self-determination.
Schools across the country are in fact amazingly similar: they are all by and
large governed by distant ideological and cultural assumptions that stand opposed to the "distortion" of local community control. As teachers across the
country mouth scripts they learned in graduate schools and administrators
institute uniform national management techniques, it is no wonder that students and parents experience teachers and administrators as "not there," as
ruled by distant forces that are never themselves visible but always "out there"
somewhere, maybe located wherever the standardized tests are devised. In
other words, as public education has been made ever more public, objective,
and impersonal, it has become ever more alienating and disempowering-like
a form of colonization or podification by the pseudo-scientific standardized
test regime with its own bases for sorting students in hierarchies of worth.
And, of course, this alienating otherness is not from nowhere-it is located in
a specific ideology of what the right-wing calls secular humanism or pointyheaded elitism, a culture emanating vaguely from the northeast, white, protestant, upper-middle class.
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From the perspective of alienation, I find it difficult to disdain even right
wing cultural interventions-like school prayer movements or advocacy of the
teaching of creationism or values education. They strike me as liberatory moments of disalienating energy seemingly struggling to subvert the hold of unseen colonizers over their local schools.
And, as I see it, it's not that the attempt to make schools truly "public"
was just done incorrectly. In retrospect, the whole idea that animated liberal
public school reform during the past several decades of making schools culturally neutral and thus open to all was seriously misguided, as is the wider attempt to neutralize the public sphere more generally by banning religion, for
example. The connection between the "public" and the "universal" as a means
for achieving social justice in institutional form is a recipe for the alienation of
all of us who live, work, and study in such institutions.
Against this backdrop, various school privatization reforms can be evaluated for their potential to break the hold of the "public" culture of professional, scientific expertise over public schools. And, to the extent they contribute
to the recovery of real democratic empowerment, they may reveal that there is
no essential connection between privatization and conservative regression.
Various school reform proposals constitute a range of privatization
options. The leading reform to date, the hiring of a private corporation to
administer schools, hardly seems like a qualitative transformation at all. To the
extent the school board retains ultimate control over the schools and sets the
terms of the contract with the private corporate entity, there is no particular
reason to think that such an administrative form is much different from the
school board hiring particular principals, superintendents, and other administrators to run the schools. In fact, such an alternative highlights a dimension in
which "full" public control is always to a certain degree management by private entities, since school policies depend for their implementation day-to-day
on individuals-the personnel of the school system-who are "private" people,
just like everyone else, except for the formal status of their employer. Contracting out management may be good or bad from the viewpoint of a progressive approach to education; it depends on the specific context. A private company may be fairer and more evenhanded in administration, fearing that student or parent discontent will endanger its contract. The result may be, oddly
enough, that the arrogance and unresponsiveness of current public school administration in most places would be replaced by a caring, loving, and responsive staff. If "pleasing the consumer" would mean not acting as if parents and
students represent impediments to the smooth running of schools, this form of
privatization might be a progressive improvement in the day to day school life.
School voucher programs, in which schools competed for students in a
market atmosphere, similarly might result in more democratic and responsive
schools. There is little doubt that school diversity would be increased; the risk
of particular schools failing to accomplish what everyone might consider a
minimum might be real and call for supervision and regulation-but given the
current state of schools in many urban settings, it hardly seems that the current
system avoids the possibility of failure to educate many at a bare minimum
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either. And given the possibility that vouchers might include private schools,
the scope of public regulation might actually increase in such a regime.6
At the opposite pole of merely contracting out management of schools as
currently constituted might be a more radical form of privatization: the auctioning off of public schools to the highest bidder. Thinking through how such
radical privatization might be accomplished reveals the "public" nature of any
private market, and the manner in which, at some analytic point, the terms
public and private seem to lose virtually all their evocative and descriptive
power.
To be sure, various measures would have to be taken to ensure against
simple looting of physical resources. One can imagine an auction proceeding
on the basis of the school commodity being defined in holistic terms-as each
school more or less in its current physical state. Moreover, to the extent that a
tuition-based school commodity would unfairly allocate educational resources
on the simple basis of family wealth, one could imagine the school commodity
structured so that it would include the power to raise funds by assessments on
the surrounding community-a municipal rather than private sort of power to
be sure, but one that could be justified within the discourse of privatization as
necessary for the schools to be able to recoup external benefits that a functioning school would provide to the local area.
The point of this thought experiment, as unrealistic as it might seem, is
that there is no essential character to how privatization might proceed. In contrast to the image of turning schools over to the greed of the profit motive and
a market in which only those able to pay the highest tuition would be truly
served (ironically, the result of public financing as currently practiced in most
places), the auction model might result in neighborhoods coming together and
pooling resources in syndicates to buy and then manage their local schools. By
decentralizing administration to the school level, a true community control
over schools, and a living connection between the school and the community,
might arise. Poorer communities might be able to trade less desirable neighborhood living conditions-the location of industrial and business areas within
the school zone-for a higher tax base from which to raise money for superior
schools. Privatization thus, ironically, could lead to a more authentic form of
"local control" than the supposedly local, democratic character of the school
board governing structure.'
There are all kinds of problems with this kind of approach to school management, and all kinds of complexities that are beyond the scope of this essay.
My point is that as one imagines even extreme forms of privatization, it is
apparent that the results do not follow any a priorilogic; such a plan might be
a disaster for egalitarian values, or it might finally allow poor people a degree
of control over their own destinies that would be successful and empowering.
Additionally, as one imagines in this context a way to structure a private market to permit recoupment of external benefits by the private enterprise, it is

6. See Starr, supra note 5, at 14 n.16.
7. See Frank 1. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 148-59 (1977).
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striking that we seem to come full circle: private schools serving neighborhoods and assessing costs based on benefits provided are a form of radically
decentralized, reconceived municipalities with the sovereign power to tax, just
as profit in traditional capitalist markets were seen, by realist and progressive
thinkers, as a form of taxation over a social product. A radical democracy, the
goal of "public" oriented values-might be achieved by the most radical forms
of "privatization."
I believe that this paradoxical result is possible because, in contrast to the
traditional ways that progressives have understood the political direction of the
"private" and "public" character of social institutions, we have tended, incorrectly, to associate justice with centralization, universalism, and neutrality. To
the extent that the movement toward the private represents a move toward
decentralization, it is not surprising that it also holds possibilities for radical
forms of democratic and popular control. The reason is that the private sphere
need not be composed of serial individuals competing in an impersonal market, but instead might consist of organic community units striving to determine
their own destinies.
Despite the above thought experiment, the school context nevertheless
seems to reveal the intractability of institutional reform in the context of
severe wealth disparity-the possibility of school privatization simply increasing the extent to which the wealthy are favored in the distribution of educational resources is just far more plausible than the utopian images I have suggested. It seems piecemeal socialist reform has always faced the flight of capital problem-so long as wealth could move to a more favorable climate.
Reform in any particular place has the inevitable potential to backfire and just
make things worse. The only conclusion that seems to me to follow is that,
whether the reform goes in the public or the private direction, a massive redistribution of wealth is a precondition to truly just institutional arrangements.
But you didn't need me to tell you that.

